Evolutionary models of communication are used to shed some light on the selective pressures involved in the evolution of simple referential signals, and the constraints hindering the emergence of signs. Error-prone communication results from errors in transmission (in which individuals learn the wrong associations) and communication (in which signs are mistaken for one another). We demonstrate how both classes of errors are required to generate diversity and subsequently impose limits on the sign repertoire within a population. We then explore the in#uence of geographic structuring of a population on the evolution of a shared sign system and the importance of such structure for the maintenance of sign diversity. Deceit tends to erode conventional signs systems thereby reducing signal diversity, we demonstrate that population structure can act as a hedge against deceit, thereby ensuring the persistence of sign systems.
Introduction
The apparent absence of animal signals comparable to human language, even among apes (Cheney & Seyfarth 1982; Savage-Rumbaugh, 1992; Savage-Rumbaugh et al., 1994) , suggests the existence of constraints on signal evolution. Some see human language as a fortunate byproduct of large brains evolved for non-linguistic purposes combined with some as yet unknown laws of structure and growth (Piatelli-Palmarini, 1989) . However, the complexity of language, its evident design for the e$cient transmission of propositional structures through a serial interface (the speech apparatus) (Pinker & Bloom, 1990) , and its &&universal'' nature (sensu. Chomsky, 1972 ) make a signalling-based hypothesis appealing. Furthermore, these design elements in language make it possible that it evolved under the pressures of Darwinian natural selection (Pinker & Bloom, 1990; SzathmaH ry & Smith, 1995) .
Adaptive evolution by natural selection can proceed at wildly variable rates, but tends towards small increments. How could a gradualistic process have gone from animal-style signals to the discrete and complex syntactic network that constitutes human language? This puzzle has led some to look for clues in the recapitulation of evolutionary history in language development (Bates et al., 1989; Studdert-Kennedy, 1998) , or in the process of creolization (Bickerton, 1990) . However, such approaches are always at risk of not distinguishing between current function and &&adaptiveness' in our ancestors. Thus, modern infants are already in possession of an advanced language device and thereby might acquire language in a fundamentally di!erent way (Pinker, 1996) . Nevertheless, the analogy between learning and early evolution has proved to be very illuminating regarding necessary expectations and constraints in language acquisition.
In this paper, we investigate what is likely to have been one of the "rst, essential steps in the evolution of a sign system, namely the formation of discrete referential signals constituting a rudimentary &&lexicon''. A lexicon is simply the set of correlations that is formed between objects and signal responses, or sounds. Thus, we explore the emergence of a simple form of reference, which it is assumed constitutes one of the "rst steps towards a more complex mode of communication.
In essence, reference makes coordination between signallers and receivers more di$cult by expanding the set of states about which information is transmitted. Reference is hardly unique to human sign systems, but the magnitude of reference found among the human species is far in excess of that found among other species. Here we attempt to characterize those factors in#uenc-ing this disparity.
Following , we employ game theoretic models that assign payo!s to communication (see also Oliphant, 1996; DiPaolo, 1997) . In the "rst part of the paper, the payo! from communication is interpreted as an &&imitative "tness'', such that an individual with a high payo! is more likely to be imitated. Under such a scenario it has been shown that the population will rapidly develop a single lexicon allowing mutual comprehension . This paper explores the in#uence of errors during communication, and errors that arise during transmission of the lexicon. We stress that both types of errors play a very important role in both facilitating the emergence of a sign system and in constraining the number and diversity of signs employed. We then consider the in#uence of geographic structuring of the population on the development of a shared lexicon and its role in facilitating lexicon evolution and how it protects against the risks of deception.
Basic Language Game
In the basic language game an individual communicates the presence of an object to another individual by making a sound. The sound produced is determined by the speaker's lexicoņ . In the simple model introduced here the lexicon consists of a single matrix P, where p GH determines the probability that sound j is associated with object i. Sound comprehension is, in turn, determined by the lexicon of the listener. Due to its probabilistic nature the rows of P must sum to one, which implies that all sounds are heard and interpreted. When the entries in P are constrained to be either 0 or 1 then this is de"ned as a consistent lexicon (as opposed to inconsistent). Each object will always be associated with the same sound by the speaker (the speaker is consistent), and each sound will be uniquely interpreted by the listener.
Consider two individuals A and B, with¸ anḑ , respectively, each referring to n objects with m sounds. We will consider m"n. The comprehension of A by B is given by the matrix product P P2 , where T indicates the transpose of P . The diagonals of this matrix product give the probability that A correctly informs B about object i, whilst the o!-diagonals give the probabilities of misunderstanding (probability that object i is understood as object j). A measure of the ability of A to convey information to B, assuming that all objects arise with equal probability, is given by
where tr+M, indicates the trace of a matrix M (sum of the diagonal elements). Note the provisional assumption that F(¸,¸ )"F(¸ ,¸), and if P is consistent F(¸,¸ )"n. If each object i has value w G then
where = is a diagonal matrix with entries +w , w , 2 , w L ,. An object could be a food resource or a predator. Thus, comprehension of A by B can be bene"cial to B, such as when an individual attends to an honest alarm call. In the evolutionary language game F(¸,¸ ) is interpreted as the payo+ gained by B listening to A. The greater the payo! to an individual the more likely its lexicon will spread through imitation to other members of the population. Predicted optimal number of sounds in a lexicon for n"50 objects at di!erent levels of communication error, and the average number of sounds in the lexica of simulated populations of size N"900 after 100 generations (when the number of sounds is stable). Ten simulations were performed for each value of "0.1, 0.2, 2 , 1.0 (the simulated results are shown as dots) and the probability of sound gain or loss at transmission was set to 0.1.
Communication Error
Communication may of course be subject to error, where sounds are mistaken one for another. We term this sort of error communication error. De"ne E as an m;m communication error matrix, where GH is the probability that sound i is heard as sound j. The "tness function is now given by 
for m"n. If we allow m to vary and rank objects according to their value such that w 'w ' w 2 and w G "0 for i'm, then for non-zero , the "tness F is found to have a maximum for some m where m(n [ Fig. 1(a) ]. In other words, there is a limit on the number of sounds in a lexicon, above which having additional sounds causes confusion and reduces overall "tness. This has been referred to as a &&pre-linguistic error limit'' . Consider the following example, using a simulation scheme as described in detail by . A population of N"900 individuals is initiated, each with the same lexicon of m"n"50 sounds. The probability that an individual in the next generation imitates the complete lexicon from a given individual in the preceding generation is then determined by that individual's relative payo! determined during the communication round. As is shown in this is not qualitatively di!erent to imitation of single signs. The payo! of an individual with lexicon¸T is given by
summing over each of the x randomly chosen individuals who communicate to v, and where¸G is the lexicon of the i-th individual. The relative imitative "tness is simply an individual's payo! divided by the summed individual payo!s for the entire population. Thus, if an individual has a relative imitative "tness of 0.1, then in the next generation each individual will imitate that individual's lexicon with probability 0.1. In these simulations, x"8 (the reason for this is made clear in Section 5). Signs are transmitted with a small probability that a sound is lost (through not being heard) or gained (through being misheard). After each loss or gain the P matrix is re-normalized. Thus, the number of sounds in the lexicon can change through time as a result of errors in transmission, and is expected to Predicted optimal number of sounds in a lexicon for n"50 objects at di!erent levels of transmission error, and the average number of sounds in the lexica of simulated populations of size N"900 after 100 generations. ( ----) shows the average for the simulated results (shown as dots). Ten simulations were performed for each value of "0.0005, 0.001, 2 , 0.005 with "xed at 0.4. The probability of sound gain or loss at transmission was 0.1. approach the optimum predicted by eqn (4). This is shown for di!erent values of communication error ( ) in Fig. 1(b) .
Transmission Error
As we have noted above, propagation of a lexicon is subject to transmission errors as sound can be added to the lexicon or existing sound}object association can be modi"ed through mis-hearing a signal. These are errors in learning signs, which play a constructive role in establishing a conventional sign system. In this section, we provide an analytical framework for understanding transmission error. In the presence of transmission error each entry in the P matrix of a lexicon, with a small probability ( ), is imitated with error. This error can involve the re-referencing of a sound in a consistent lexicon, or the altering of the matrix entry by a small, uniformly distributed random number in the case of an inconsistent lexicon. One can see that transmission error is essential to the evolution of shared sign system. In the presence of transmission error a population of individuals with random, inconsistent signs can evolve towards a population with a single shared, consistent lexicon (Nowk & Krakauer, 1999) .
Although transmission error is essential for the coordination of a shared lexicon, it also acts to restrict the number of sounds in the lexicon. A balance is reached between selection amongst individuals favouring a lexicon, and transmission error eroding the lexicon. This balance is analogous to the mutation}selection balance seen in genetic evolution (Burger, 1998; Haldane, 1937) .
Consider a large population where each individual possess the same consistent lexicon¸. We introduce transmission error such that is the probability, assumed to be small, that an entry in P is transmitted with error, thus generating a new lexicon,¸G. In this case, we can assume that the inequality F 'F G for all iO1 will hold at any time (the population is in transmission error}selection balance). Let f"f , f , 2 , f I be the frequency of each lexicon in the population, where there are k possible lexica. In the case, "0 the population will be in a globally stable equilibrium f "$1, 0, 2 , 0. A population with small will be in a locally stable equilibrium f which satis"es f !f "O( ) (cf. Burger, 1998) . Therefore, to the "rst order the expected "tness of a randomly chosen member of the population is given by
since there are mn opportunities for mutation away from¸ at transmission. Thus, "tness is reduced by transmission error pushing lexica away from¸. This further limit imposed on the number of sounds in a lexicon by transmission error is shown in Fig. 2. 372 N. C. GRASSLY E¹ A¸.
Population Structure
So far we have only considered the evolution of shared signs in a population where every individual has an equal probability of communicating with every other individual. The social structure of a population and its distribution over a landscape make this assumption unrealistic. In this section, we introduce population structure into the game theoretic models.
Imagine a structured population in which the N individuals occupy the vertices of an X;> grid, where X;>"N and opposing edges of the grid are joined (it is a torus). Each individual plays a language game with its eight neighbours, the &&Moore'' neighbourhood (Durrett & Levin, 1994) . Neighbourhood can re#ect space in the conventional sense, or social structure such that &&neighbours'' are those individuals who are in positions within a social group such that they regularly and exclusively communicate. After each round of communication, if an individual has a greater payo! than its neighbour, then its vertex becomes occupied by the lexicon of this neighbour.
We "rstly examine the dynamics in a wellmixed system with a coordination number equivalent to that of the Moore neighbourhood. Consider a population with two sign systems, and¸ , and no transmission error. In a nonstructured (&&panmictic'') population, the "tness of a chosen individual v is given by eqn (5). Let x"8 (as for structured population), and de"ne the two lexica,¸ and¸ , such that
, F(¸,¸ )" , etc. The expected "tness of an individual given that it has lexicon¸ is given by
where f is the frequency of lexicon¸ in the population and f the frequency of lexicon¸ .
In the special case, where " "1 and " "0 then this expected "tness is binomially distributed with expectation E(F )" 8 f , and variance <(F )"8 f (1!f ). If we assume N is large then the average "tness of a member of the population is given by
. (8) Thus, the expected "tness of an average member of the population increases as f tends from 0 to 1. The expected frequency of lexicon¸ in the next generation is much harder to calculate, as it involves summing over all possible combinations of eight individuals for each communication event to calculate the expected overall &&"tness'' of lexicon¸. However, if we ignore variation in the communication process by allowing the number of individuals each individual communicates with to tend to R, then the expected frequency of lexicon A in the next generation is
where f (t) is the frequency of lexicon¸ at time t. This can be plotted recursively for several generations (Fig. 3) , and clearly demonstrates the rapid evolution of a bi-lexical population to one with a single lexicon (where f "0 or 1) when the starting frequency f (0) deviates from 0.5. In other words, once a lexicon begins to dominate in a non-structured population, positive frequencydependent selection causes the population to very quickly become mono-lexical for that lexicon. Thus, the numerically dominant sign system acts as a &&language steamroller'' #attening out the signal diversity in the population.
In an explicitly structured population this loss of lexical diversity does not occur since it is only necessary for an individual to have more lexically identical neighbours than the neighbours themselves to form a stable (un-invadable) linguistic community. Inde"nite coexistence of independent sign systems becomes possible. The argument appears to apply to populations where there are at least 2 or more alternative sign systems. However, this is analytically di$cult to prove. Instead, we simulated the evolutionary language game 100 times with and without a structured population of size N"900 initiated with individuals possessing random consistent sign systems. After 50 generations the number of sign systems typically reached an equilibrium and was noted. In the non-structured case at equilibrium the population was always mono-lexical, whereas for the structured population the average number of sign systems was 20.92 (S.D."1.55). In the presence of transmission error ( "10\) overall lexical diversity was also higher in the structured population with a mean number of sign systems given by 33.45 (S.D."3.96), compared to the nonstructured population where the mean was 9.64 (S.D."1.62). Thus, error creates transient diversity even in the non-structured case, analogous to a quasispecies distribution of mutant genes around a single wild type.
Deception
Natural selection results in the di!erential survival of sign systems according to the relative payo!s of the individuals possessing them. Thus, any strategy that can be acquired along with the lexicon and which augments an individual's payo!s will spread. Deception is common to almost all natural communication systems, from warning colouration to primate vocalizations. A long-standing question in behavioural ecology has been how honesty in natural populations can be maintained. Under some restricted conditions, cost can ensure honesty (Zahavi, 1977; Grafen, 1990) . One property of arbitrary sign systems is that costs of production are very low, and hence conventional handicap style arguments do not seem pertinent. We consider how deception will spread in the evolutionary language game, where deception implies transmitting false information in order to pro"t from comprehension. We then explore more plausible, cost-free mechanisms for stabilizing honesty.
To incorporate deceit, the payo! from comprehension received by listener B [eqn (3)] is reduced by a factor 0(t (1, the truthfulness of speaker A, which determines the probability that A signals honestly. The payo! received by B listening to speaker A is now given by
We de"ne an &&honest'' individual as one where t "1, and all other individuals &&deceivers'', where deceivers lie in all encounters.
Consider a non-structured population with a single, consistent lexicon¸in the absence of transmission error and where F(¸,¸)"1. This lexicon may be associated with honesty¸& or deceit¸". If we assume, as before, that the population size N is large then the expected "tness of an individual is given by
where all deceivers have truthfulness t and f & is the frequency of honesty in the population [cf. eqn (7)]. Since an individual's truthfulness does not have an impact on its own payo!, there is no pressure for honesty in communication.
Truthfulness values can drift and the strength of selection for a shared lexicon is reduced. Perhaps more realistically deceit may be rewarded with a "tness pay-o! proportional to the frequency of deceitful utterances (1!t). For example, communication may be about a food resource that the speaker could utilize were the listener to be misinformed. If b is the coe$cient of proportionality determining the relative bene"t from deceit then
since each individual listens to eight others. Clearly, deceit will always spread in the case that 1/8'b'0. Furthermore, the "tness received by a deceitful individual is maximized when t"0. If the value of t is transmitted with error then it will evolve in the population towards this optimal value and there will no longer be selection for a shared lexicon. Therefore, in a non-structured population deceit, even if only marginally bene"cial to the speaker, undermines lexicon formation.
In a structured population the spread of deception or honesty is in#uenced by the fact that individuals are more likely to communicate with their imitative &&o!spring''. Honesty therefore has an inherent advantage (Krakauer & Pagel, 1995; Nowak & May, 1992) . Space has the e!ect of creating local pockets of high relatedness (Van Ballen & Rand, 1998) . The stability of honesty at a given frequency is di$cult to determine since it depends on the exact distribution of honest individuals in the structured population. Instead, we determine whether honesty will invade a population of deceivers ( f & K0), by considering whether the neighbours of an honest individual become honest, given that they are currently deceitful. In the case that only one individual is honest, honesty will not spread since the honest individual will encounter only deceit, gaining a "tness payo! of 8t, whilst its deceitful neighbours will gain 1#7t#8b(1!t). The latter payo! is always greater than 8t except when t"1, in which case the neighbours are honest as de"ned.
If a 2;2 group of honest individuals arises through chance, the increase in the number of honest neighbours allows honesty to spread under certain conditions. The "tness of a member of the honest community is simply G & "3#5t, since each individual has three honest and "ve deceitful neighbours (see Fig. 4) . The "tness of a deceiver is largest when it has the maximum possible number of honest neighbours, which is 2. The "tness payo! for such a deceiver is G " "2#6t#8b(1!t). For honesty to invade
, which results in the constraint that b(0.125. If honesty expands beyond a 2;2 community, then for further expansion the same constraint must hold for expansion to the boundary corners (position a in Fig. 4) , whilst at the edges (position b) the constraint is relaxed such that b(0.25. Therefore, in contrast to a non-structured population honesty can invade and remain stable in a structured population, as long as the reward from deceitful behaviour is not too great (0)b(0.125). In this way, a structured population can maintain a shared lexicon where it would be lost by a non-structured population. This result will hold for di!erent arrangements of individuals within a structured population, although with di!erent constraints on b, as long as individuals are more likely to communicate with their imitative descendents.
A further bu!er against deceit has been explored by Nettle & Dunbar (1997) , where high rates of change within the sign system give cheats a moving target. Thus, &&mutability'' becomes in e!ect a strategy for escaping from the costs of dishonesty. Such a strategy is evidently constrained by the need to maintain coordination, spatial structure promotes such coordination.
DIVERSE SIGN SYSTEMS

Discussion
Using simple game theoretic models of referential signalling we have explored the in#uence of two sources of error on the &&evolution'' of an imitation-propagated sign system. Transmission errors (mistakes during sign acquisition) and communication errors (mistakes in the perception of signs) both limit the maximum number of sounds in a lexicon. Larger sign systems (greater m) are unlikely to be acquired without error, and an increased number of sounds, promotes the probability of mis-identifying an individual sound. It is therefore expected that organisms with error prone communication mechanisms (communication error) or poor learning ability (transmission error) will have sign systems of a restricted size with the ability to refer to only a few objects. Furthermore, within a population, all individuals are observed to employ the same conventional lexicon. If the rates of transmission error are large, then transient lexical diversity is observed, re#ecting non-competent sign usage.
Thus, one might argue that these two sources of error have acted historically to both facilitate the emergence of referential sign systems and subsequently imposed upper bounds on their diversity. Given the near inevitability of such errors it remains somewhat mysterious that discrete, referential signs should be so rarely reported. It is certainly not correct to argue that signal usage is restricted to those species &&smart'' enough to use them. Dogs, parrots (Farrabaugh & Dooling, 1996 ), dolphins (Reiss & McCowan, 1993 and apes can all be taught new arbitrary signals relatively easily up until some small number. And yet these species do not appear to use this capability naturally. It is instructive to note that primate sign use has relied on an arti"cial technology (computer-assisted, iconic sign systems) in order to teach arbitrary symbol}object associations (Savage}Rumbaugh, 1992) . The explanation does appear to be the need to keep the signal clean and thereby easy to discriminate. The X-ray analysis of the vocal tracts of apes shows that the larynx is positioned towards the back of the mouth, high in comparison to humans. This arrangement limits the range of vowel sounds that can be produced. Lieberman (1992) has suggested that animal signals have been largely constrained by the inability to produce clear signals, and that an expanded vocal repertoire was the essential pre-adaptation for the evolution of articulate signals. Of course, it could be some independent factor that promoted communication, and the vocal tract evolved as an adaptation in response to this pressure. Nonetheless, the modern supralaryngeal vocal tract is the central engineering tool for producing language. Thus, Liberman's theory makes perfecting of human speech an integral element of human language. A position consistent with the importance errors play in constraining sign systems in our models.
In contemporary humans there are specialized neuro-anatomical structures serving language production. Broca's area, involved in the construction of sentences in H. sapiens, appears in endocasts of fossil australopithecine crania 2.5 Myr ago, and is clearly present together with Wernicke's area in fossil H. habilis from 2 Myr ago (Deacon, 1992) . The neural mechanisms and structures involved in the production of articulate speech are thought to have arisen about 1.6 Myr (Lieberman, 1992) . It is as recent as 50 000 years ago that reasonable archaeological evidence of language arises, in the form of complex tool technology and signs of conceptualization and planning, trade, art and ritual (Holden, 1998) . Thus, biological traits correlated with speech production have arisen and undergone systematic change. This would suggest that speech itself has undergone systematic change. Hence, signals and anatomy appear to have &&co-evolved'' in order to improve the production and perception of signals.
Using our models we "nd that social or geographic structuring of populations promotes the stability of small sign communities and consequently fosters lexical diversity. Each sign community can refer to di!erent objects using a common set of sounds. Thus, if objects are distributed heterogeneously through the environment a structured, poly-lexical population is able to communicate about a larger number of objects than a mono-lexical, panmictic one. This is analogous to the phenotypic specializations seen within populations responding to a diversity of ecological niches. The explanation for the increased diversity is that no single sign community exceeds the linguistic error threshold. An examination of human language, and indeed animal signals, testi"es to the important role of spatial segregation in allowing for signal diversity. The average community size in our models is determined exclusively by the payo!s derived from the lexicon. Within contemporary human society there are many other factors at play, including at the very least economic and military power (Cavalli-Sforza & Cavalli-Sforza, 1995) .
Deceit erodes shared sign systems by selecting in favour of receivers who choose not to attend to signals. Thus, in panmicitc populations, the prevailing lexicon will only persist if signallers and receiver cooperate (as is assumed in . This is unlikely to always be the case. A reliable source of pro"t is the gullibility of receivers. Hence, &&crying wolf '' is expected to evolve in order to manipulate the &&beliefs'' of receivers (Dawkins & Krebs, 1978) . Where we observe sign usage naturally, among vervets, bees or humans, there is evidence of persistence of signals. How are these maintained in the face of this fundamental instability? Non-referential, a!ective/emotional animal signals can be maintained by cost. Hence, reliability is ensured by making deception pay a disproportionate penalty (Zahavi, 1977; Grafen, 1990) . There is little evidence of a high cost of &&words'' in human language. Indeed, it is very di$cult to derive the veracity of propositions based on signal content alone. There must be an additional means of penalizing dishonesty. Population structure can ensure the stability of sign systems even in the face of deceit. This is because payo!s are determined by local interactions thereby promoting the emergence of cooperative or honest sign systems through a mechanism of repeated encounters. In our model these payo!s are the immediate spatial neighbours on a lattice. Some memory of interlocutors can replace space in a panmictic population, through a strategy of image scoring (Nowak & Sigmund, 1998) . Both mechanisms will allow a sign system to evolve through repeated interactions with the same individuals. 
